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Abstract
With increasing attention given to wild animal welfare and ethics, it
has become common to depict animals outside of captivity as existing
in a state of predominantly suffering. This assumption is now taken
on board by many and frames much of the current discussion; but
needs a more critical assessment, both theoretically and empirically.
In this paper, we challenge the primary lines of evidence employed in
support of wild animal suffering, to provide an alternative picture in
which wild animals may often have much more positive lives than is
commonly assumed. Nevertheless, while it is useful to have an alter-
native model to challenge unexamined assumptions, our real emphasis
in this paper is the need for the development of effective methods for
applying animal welfare science in the wild, including new means of
data collection, the ability to determine the extent and scope of welfare
challenges and opportunities, and their effects on welfare.
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The welfare of wild animals has been the subject of a recent surge of atten-
tion. Historically, although a few authors noted the occurrence of suffering
in nature, particularly regarding predation, the prevailing view was that we
should not intervene in the lives of wild animals, either because they were
considered to fall outside our sphere of ethical concern, or because we could
not expect such interventions to be successful (e.g. Regan 1983; Singer 1973).
More recently, this view has been challenged, with authors arguing both that
suffering is far more prevalent than the traditional view assumes and that we
have duties to intervene where we can (e.g. Ng 1995; Horta 2015; Johannsen
2020b). There are thus two big questions that shape the current discussion
on wild animal welfare: Firstly, what is the welfare status of wild animals?
And secondly, how should or ought we intervene to assist them?
The latter question has been engaged by ethicists and scientists alike.
Animal ethicists have worked to determine what our moral duties toward
wild animals may be, though as we will show, this work has often rested on
problematic and speculative assumptions (Johannsen 2020b; Keulartz 2016;
Kianpour and Paez 2021; Palmer 2013; Soryl et al. 2021). Whereas the fact
that some moral theory implied a duty to intervene on behalf of wild animals
had previously been used as a reductio ad absurdum to suggest a flaw in the
theory itself, others are now taking more seriously that this could instead be
a legitimate conclusion (McMahan 2015). The distinction between animals
in the wild and in captivity is slowly disappearing when it comes to moral
concern. Yet, while many now accept the moral call to protect the interests
and welfare of wild animals, some deny that it is feasible in practice, and
thus not something that requires attention. This, of course, is an empirical
claim and has scarcely received scientific support, instead largely resting
on intuition. Scientific work will help determine which actions are actually
feasible, requiring an understanding of ecosystem processes - a point we will
return to in Section 6. However, this subject is not the focus of our paper.
Instead, we engage with the first question, of what the welfare of animals
outside of captivity is actually like. This is the scientific question of wild
animal welfare.
We need to know how good (or bad) the lives of wild animals are, and
what conditions are having the greatest impact, before we can start to con-
sider if or how we should intervene. To put it succinctly: we first have to



























‘ought to be’. In particular, we challenge the now-prevailing view that the
lives of wild animals contain more suffering than pleasure; that the balance of
wild animal welfare is net-negative (Horta 2010; Johannsen 2020b; Ng 1995;
Tomasik 2015). This view is now taken on board by many and frames most of
the current discussion; but we think it needs a more critical assessment, both
theoretically and empirically. In this paper we will examine this claim and
the evidence offered in support of it to show that an account of net-positive
wild animal welfare is at least plausible given the evidence. However, as we
will emphasise throughout, this is not a question that can be settled by pure
armchair philosophy (or ethics), but rather one that requires more empirical
data regarding the lives and experiences of wild animals. There is a need
for measurement of the welfare of wild animals of different species and life
stages, to draw accurate conclusions. Otherwise all we have are our own
unreliable intuitions about the possible features of animal experiences. And
empirically uninformed philosophy has in many cases proven to be deeply
impoverished and misleading.
Here, we follow the recent appeal for greater scientific attention to wild
animal welfare, such as in the call for the establishment of the disciplines
of welfare biology (Ng 1995; Soryl et al. 2021), and conservation welfare
(Beausoleil et al. 2018), though the latter is primarily an attempt to base
conservation on a foundation of animal welfare ethics with the individual,
rather than the population at the centre of our concern (?Learmonth 2020).
Welfare biology, on the other hand, is more directly intended as a natural-
ist approach to animal welfare that seeks to use the methods of a range
of biological sciences, such as animal welfare science, behavioural ecology,
and evolutionary biology, to assess the previously overlooked subject of the
welfare of wild animals and extend our focus from animals in captivity to
all animals. Work on animals outside of captivity, however, has hitherto
primarily focused on their ecology, behaviour, nutrition, conservation, with
scant attention paid to what their lives are like from their own point of view,
i.e. their subjective experience (Griffin 1976). Though there are many ways
of understanding animal welfare (Veit and Browning 2021), here we follow
the dominant tradition in the wild animal welfare literature in taking animal
welfare to consist in the subjective experiences of animals, a position we have
also used and defended elsewhere (Browning 2019, 2018; Browning and Veit
2020b). Animals outside of captivity are individuals, like all animals, and
beyond simply being ecosystem actors, also have lives in which they seek out



























to look to find the best methods for discovering what this balance between
positive and negative feeling, or ‘affects’, may be for different species, and
how we might help in removing sources of suffering and promoting sources
of pleasure.
The current literature is certainly right to challenge traditional assump-
tions that wild animals have high welfare resulting from their ‘flourishing’
in their evolved, species-typical manner. The dominant public conception
of wild animals still appears to be one of a more ‘idyllic’ state of nature
(Faria and Paez 2015; Waldhorn 2019). It is common for people to take wild
animals to have good lives, a viewpoint which forms the basis for a lot of
the resistance to housing captive animals (Browning and Veit 2021, 2020a).
But these views are often based in intuition, rather than actual empirical
evidence. As many have pointed out, and we will see in this paper, there are
many sources of suffering that wild animals face. Unfortunately, this has in
many cases led to them going too far the other way, exaggerating the preva-
lence of suffering. While this may be important to encourage interest in the
subject, and to counter the previously received view, it is also dangerous to
work on misinformation if we want to make a real difference in animal lives.
This article is organized in a linear fashion to tackle head on the four
primary lines of evidence that are used to illustrate the dominance of suffering
in nature and support the claim that most animals may actually have lives
with net-positive welfare, or what would be considered ‘lives worth living’.
Section 2, ‘Bad Deaths’, challenges the assumption that deaths in nature
contain extreme amounts of suffering. Section 3, ‘Bad Lives’, challenges
the assumption that the daily lives of wild animals necessarily have a low
quality of life. Section 4, ‘Reproductive Strategies’ challenges the assumption
that the dominant life-history strategy of r-selected species must necessarily
involve a lot of suffering. Finally, Section 5, ‘Economic Models’, challenges
the economic model by Ng (1995) that attempted to show that life in the wild
necessarily involves more suffering than pleasure. After having discussed the
evidence base for wild animal welfare, Section 6, ‘The Intervention Question’,
will discuss the issue of whether animal welfare interventions in the wild are
feasible, suggesting numerous ways in which wild animal welfare could be
improved. Section 7, ‘Conclusion and Further Directions’ summarizes the
key points of this paper, emphasising that more data is urgently needed
to settle the matter and allow us to move forwards with planning effective
strategies for assistance where required and suggesting further directions for



























understanding of the lives of other sentient animals.
2 Bad Deaths
The first line of evidence that is often used in support of the predominance
of suffering in the wild is the extreme pain and suffering surrounding animal
deaths. In particular, predation is frequently taken as the paradigm case
of the worst suffering that the wild has to offer – animals that are chased
down by predators before being torn apart and eaten, often while still alive,
creating states of fear and of excruciating pain. McMahan (2015) presses
the point, giving a vivid description of the “continuous massacre” and “un-
ceasing mass suffering” caused by predators “stalking, chasing, capturing,
killing, and devouring their prey” through “dismemberment, asphyxiation,
disembowelment, poison, and so on” (McMahan 2015 p. 268). Such intu-
itions are widespread and evocative from wildlife documentaries, but that of
course does not mean that this picture is necessarily true. In this section we
argue that bad deaths will not count as much toward the overall balance of
lifetime welfare as is often assumed, both because the duration is short and
the intensity of suffering is significantly lower than it may first seem.
Firstly, the experience of suffering during death may not be as intense as
one may think. Take predation – the prey experiences the pain of capture,
killing and consumption. While anecdotes of animals suffering for days after
an attack before their subsequent death are easily stored in our memory,
most animals in the wild are killed quickly once they are caught, precisely
because they might otherwise escape. They are often dispatched with a bite
to the skull or nape of the neck and thus would experience minimal pain. Of
course, we do not wish to deny that some animals, such as African wild dogs
or hyaenas, will catch and consume their prey while still alive, ripping out
entrails and chewing on limbs as the animal dies more slowly from the injuries
(Dawkins 1980 p. 52). This certainly sounds horrific and is not what any
of us would envision as a humane death, but it may not be representative
for most deaths taking place in the wild. Furthermore, it is also highly
possible that these animals experience little pain at the time of death, due to a
shock response. This experience has been reported in humans who have been
severely injured in accidents. While they can recognise the extent of their
injuries, it often takes time for the pain to begin. For example, Livingstone



























of his injuries after his escape (Bostock 2003, p.85). This may explain the
observed response in many animals captured and consumed by hyaenas: “it
is rare that the victim puts up any significant active defence” (Kruuk 1972,
cited in Dawkins 1980, p. 52). McMahan (2015) notes this, and that human
reports vary widely – some will indeed report shock or unconsciousness that
prevents pain, while others report extreme pain and terror. As he concludes,
there is thus likely to be variation in the intensity of pain experience for prey.
He adds that the evolutionary function of pain likely tips the scales toward
pain experience in these cases, however we contend that the opposite is more
likely.
The primary function of pain appears to be to motivate avoidance and re-
covery, triggering behaviours that may actually interfere with defensive and
escape responses. Suffering itself may be the interference with our cognitive
abilities (Dennett 2017). If this is the case then is only after the fact that
pain would be functionally useful. More so, it would be fitness-reducing if
the animal could not use its cognitive capacities to escape in a life-or-death
situation. While it is certainly true that “evolution has no reason to prevent
death from feeling unbearably awful” (Tomasik 2015, p. 136), if it is benefi-
cial to allow animals to experience shock to facilitate escape, this may then
also benefit dying animals. This is a form of ‘shock-induced analgesia’ that
uses adrenaline and endorphins to temporarily block pain (Amit and Galina
1986). Some experimental evidence may support this; that activation of
the fear system inhibits the pain response through production of endogenous
analgesics. Rats exposed to predators (cats) show opioid-mediated analgesia,
demonstrating reduced sensitivity to noxious stimuli, that is reversed with
the opioid antagonist naltrexone (Lester and Fanselow 1985). This mech-
anism will then reduce the intensity of suffering for prey animals during
death. We are not here trying to make a strong claim regarding the intensity
of experience of animals during death – this is something that can only be
established empirically. We are only trying to show that there are reasons to
believe it may not be as severe as some would claim based on introspection
and intuition alone.
Furthermore, there is also the possibility of counting the behavioural and
gustatory pleasures experienced by predators during the hunt and kill as
a small offset to the suffering of the prey. In some cases - such as quick
predation of hatchling fish – it has been claimed that the net enjoyment
for the predator could even outweigh the negative experience for the prey



























involve intense suffering, we should still not rank them too highly. The
duration of such experiences is short, relative to the totality of an animal’s
life experience and thus it is likely to be the case that the quality of the
‘average’ day overall is the biggest determinant of overall welfare (we will
address the case of short-lived animals in Section 3). Unless the overall life
quality is very close to zero and the death is extremely painful and drawn
out, it is unlikely to outweigh overall. Take predation again: where deaths
by predators are described as being slow, they are still in the scale of minutes
rather than hours. McMahan (2015) describes them as “a quarter of an hour
or more” (McMahan 2015, p. 279), which is undeniably an unpleasant length
of time, but not one that is likely to outweigh a length of life. The claim
that “even if animals enjoy net happiness during most of their lives, this may
be outweighed by the painful intensity of their deaths” (Tomasik 2015, p.
139) must therefore appear to be somewhat overblown. Emphasising short
bursts of extreme pain can bias us to think of a life as worse than it is overall,
influencing us to consider them as representative for a whole life experience.
Other types of deaths will be more prolonged and thus possibly a cause of
more suffering overall – a lower intensity, but a longer duration. Typically, the
longer the duration of the death stage, the lower intensity we would expect
it to be – it is rare to find an excruciating prolonged experience. Deaths
of starvation or illness may occur over days or even weeks, during which
the animals will feel highly unwell, but even these are still short in terms
of most animal lifetimes. This may be truer for larger animals with long
lives than for small ones with shorter lives (as there are more opportunities
for counterweighing positive experiences). These points should at least take
much of the initial force out of the intuitively plausible arguments that death
is major influence on lifetime welfare in most cases. Nevertheless, as we will
emphasize throughout this article, actual research establishing the duration
and intensity of suffering during death is needed to answer this question
properly. Let us thus now turn to the question of whether the total life
experience of an animal is itself bad.
3 Bad Lives
Even if we remove considerations of the pain and suffering around death,
there are still many sources of suffering during life that may lead us to think



























a painful death. There are a wide range of negative experiences that animals
face every day: fear, disease, pain, itches, thirst, and starvation, among
many others. However, what is often not considered are the range of positive
experiences also available to wild animals. Whereas researchers and the
public alike are happy to attribute negative experiences and emotions to
other animals, the consideration of positive experiences has been far rarer.
This may partially be due to implicit evolutionary reasoning: whereas pain
is intuitively intelligible as an evolutionary response to avoid harms and
dangers, pleasure - such as exhibited by play-behaviour on many mammals
- has long puzzled researchers to provide a functional explanation (though
this is now changing, e.g. Burghardt 1985). Whereas animal welfare science
was originally almost exclusive concerned with reductions of suffering, there
is now also a focus on creating positive experiences for other animals (Yeates
and Main 2008).
It is therefore not enough to merely establish that there are many sources
of suffering – we must also show that they are of a sufficient frequency and
intensity to outweigh the positive experiences, and this requires us to include
description of both (a point also raised by Mikkelson 2018). We cannot
here establish this one way or the other, without much more data regarding
the daily conditions of wild animals and their impact on welfare experience.
However, we give some reasons to consider that the balance may be more
often positive than negative. Our strategy here is threefold – to show that
some of the negative experiences may be less prevalent than claimed, to
show that most will be offset by countervailing positive affects, and finally
to suggest that there may be a positive baseline experience.
Many negative experiences may not be as frequent or intense as some
of the literature in this area would imply. A good example of this is fear.
Fear is taken to be a huge source of suffering for prey animals. While it is
almost certainly true that animals being pursued by predators experience an
extreme fear (motivating the flight response), this will typically only last for
a minute or two (Bostock 2003). However, it has also been claimed that prey
animals live in a constant state of fear, watching and waiting for the next
predator attack. The behaviour of prey animals is strongly determined by the
presence of predators, effects known as ‘fear ecology’ (Ogden 2016; Zanette
and Clinchy 2019) and the ‘landscape of fear’ (Laundre et al. 2010). Prey
animals will reduce breeding efforts and change foraging patterns and habitat
use in environments with predators (Laundre et al. 2010; Ogden 2016); effects



























a proximate mediation (Ogden 2016). Animals will suffer behavioural, phys-
iological and neurobiological costs that may decrease their welfare (Zanette
and Clinchy 2019). Studies on the effects of prolonged predator exposure on
laboratory rats and mice have demonstrated that this can result in strong
stress and anxiety responses (both behavioural and physiological), that shows
slow habituation (Belzung et al. 2001; Blanchard et al. 1998) (however, it is
worth keeping in mind that these last are studies of captive animals with very
little control over their escape options - Belzung et al. 2001 even emphasise
that it is exposure to “unavoidable” predators they have tested - and thus
we must be cautious about the ecological validity).
There is no doubt that predator presence has strong effects on prey, but
what is currently missing is the links to affect. It is not clear that these
behavioural and physiological responses are associated with negative subjec-
tive experience. Behavioural changes could also be the result of caution –
a risk-benefit tradeoff calculation. While prey animals may suffer decreased
welfare in the presence of predators, in terms of reduced opportunities, it
does not necessarily follow that there is a constant feeling of fear. In fact,
it seems unlikely that many animals live in a state of chronic stress; it is
certainly not adaptive. Stress responses are bad for organisms – they inter-
fere with other body processes, suppress the immune system and potentially
even alter the epigenome of offspring – and these are reasons animals are
likely to minimise them (Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019; Sapolsky 2004). We
need measures of subjective fear experience in order to determine whether
or not this is actually a constant welfare challenge. Although this is just
one example, it serves to illustrate a more general point: we must be care-
ful not to conflate the presence of stressors or harms with the experience of
negative affects – evidence of a stress or disease response for instance is not
sufficient to assume negative experience without additional evidence linking
this to welfare, such as behaviour. While of course most stressors and harms
will have some negatively experienced component, the degree and intensity
of this cannot just be taken for granted.
Our second argument is that most non-lethal sources of negative expe-
rience will be balanced by counteracting positive experiences. This makes
sense if we consider the functional role of affects. Most accounts of the evolu-
tion of valenced experience – the ability to experience positive and negative
mental state – take affects to play a motivational and decision-making role in
guiding animal behaviour (e.g. Cabanac 1992; Dawkins 1998; Spruijt et al.



























stimuli or seek methods of reducing the experience, while positive affects will
reward animals for behaviours that are in their interests (Fraser and Duncan
1998). Frequently, these will be paired. For example, an animal deprived of
food will feel hunger, a negative affect that motivates it to seek out something
to eat, which is important for building and maintaining their body. However,
there are also positive affects that reward the experience of eating – satiation
(the feeling of fullness after a meal), gustatory pleasure (the enjoyable taste
of preferred food) and even behavioural pleasures in seeking and processing
the food, such as the satisfaction of hunting behaviours.
So while animals experience negative affects when things are going wrong,
they will also have positive experiences when they correct for these, and these
positives will cancel out at least some of the overall negative experience.
Being cold feels bad, but curling up in a cosy den feels good. We need more
information to determine the intensity and duration of all these positive and
negative experiences to determine if, and by how much, one set may outweigh
the other. It is true that evolution does not ‘care’ about welfare and there is
no evolutionary reason for welfare to be maximised beyond motivating fitness-
enhancing behaviour, such that there will be cases where the two come apart
and fitness ‘wins’ (Soryl et al. 2021). However, we would expect that most
often the two will work in tandem, else the potentially costly affects would
not be preserved. A ‘Benthamite’ model of pleasure maximization may work
reasonably well.
Finally, there are additional positive experiences that animals can have
over their lifetime. Social bonds, affiliative behaviour, courtship, mating
and rearing offspring are all potential sources of positive experience. Young
animals play a lot - and sometimes older animals join in - behaviours which
are typically taken to be indicative of positive welfare (Held and Špinka 2011).
A recent study suggests that presence of endogenous opioids signals that
birds find singing intrinsically pleasurable (Stevenson et al. 2020). So even
beyond simply the satisfaction of bodily needs that weigh against the negative
experiences of dissatisfaction, there are additional positives an animal can
experience, that help shift the balance back in a positive direction.
In particular, we may consider that the ‘baseline’ experience of an ani-
mal is mildly positive. If we strip away all the particular physical demands,
the experience of just existing could be a positive one – a “joy of living”
(Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019, p. 189). This makes sense from an evolution-
ary standpoint – that an animal for whom existence is positively valenced is



























2011). It could even have formed the earliest types of experiencing, an “inner
feeling of living which if experienced as positive, would drive behaviors that
sustain it and lead to the evolution of what we call more specific ‘wanting’”
(Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019, p. 189). This is not to imply that a sophisti-
cated cognitive representation is needed, but merely that a positive feeling is
one which an individual may fight to maintain. This is also likely to be true
of the basic acts of exploration and engagement with their environment –
the ‘SEEKING’ system is one of the proposed core affects such that moving
about and investigating new spaces and objects will be a source of pleasure
(Panksepp 2005). Exploration provides the benefits of new knowledge and
learning, and it thus makes sense for it to be motivated by associated positive
affect (Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019). If this is true, then this gives us even
more reason to think that the negatives don’t have to outweigh the positives.
One counter to this type of reasoning is to deny that we can compare
positive and negative experiences in this way – either within a single animal
or across different individuals. For example, Belshaw (2016) argues that
positive experiences cannot compensate for negative experiences within the
lifetime of an animal. This is not a claim that suffering is so bad that
no amount of pleasure can outweigh it, but that for an animal, the lack
of psychological continuity or integration over time means that moments of
intense suffering make life not worth living for that animal, regardless of
past or future pleasures. In reply, Vǐsak (2017) shows that, on any plausible
reading of this claim, it is not true. Pleasurable experiences should be able
to compensate suffering for animals, just as they can for us – the value is
not only a feature of the way our lives cohere. Harnad 2016 argues that we
cannot aggregate experiences across different individuals – that “my orgasms
cannot be traded off against others’ agony”. This is a stronger claim, that we
cannot aggregate welfare across individuals at all. Of course, this is a claim
against the very premise of a utilitarian calculus that motivates much work in
animal welfare science and (human) happiness studies alike, and the defence
of an entire ethical framework is not one we can attempt here. Within the
debate we are engaging with, it is taken to be the case that such comparisons
are allowable; though there may be additional difficulties in practice when
attempting to compare welfare across individuals or species (Browning 2020).
As is often the case, difficulty of comparison and measurement does not imply
impossibility.
Again, we are not making any strong claims about the distribution of



























ferent experiences is likely to vary widely across species and can only be
determined by careful investigation into the lives of different animals. What
is crucial is that we examine not only the sources of suffering, but also the
sources of positive experience, and how they are weighted by the animals.
We have provided here some reasons for optimism that in many cases, this
balance will be positive.
4 Reproductive strategies
Even if one accepts all that we have presented above, they can still hold
that suffering dominates in nature, and most animals will have net-negative
lives. This is because the majority of animals born are of so-called ‘r-selected’
species. This is a life-history strategy in which animals that pursue it produce
a very large number of offspring, with low parental investment, where most
will die quickly but a few will make it through to the next generation. This
is particularly common in smaller species, such as invertebrates, and fish,
amphibians and reptiles. In contrast are K-selected species, like humans,
that produce a small number of offspring with high parental investment in
each, to ensure a high rate of survival. While these strategies are part of a
larger spectrum, most animals can be described as tending toward one end
or the other. These strategies ensure that most animals born will be more
r-selected, as a single parent can produced hundreds or in some cases even
millions of offspring, with the expectation that only a few will survive. While
a large proportion of these may not even survive to birth/hatching, it still
leaves a large number that will be born and will die shortly after. This means
that most animals that ever exist will have short lives with a lot of suffering
– dying quickly from predation, or starvation when competing for resources
against their siblings and conspecifics. Their lives are taken to be almost
entirely suffering, and thus the number of animals with net-negative lives
will outweigh those surviving members who have positive lives (Horta 2010).
In this section we will challenge this conclusion on two grounds. Firstly, we
deny that this strategy does necessarily result in a large amount of suffering,
and secondly, that it is sufficient to outweigh the positive welfare in the lives
of other animals.
There are two reasons to doubt that this strategy creates overwhelming
suffering. The first is that the lives of those that die early may not be en-



























experience small pleasures of exploring, finding food etc., and not only dizzy-
ing fear, pain and hunger. Pleasure and suffering are not directly correlated
with survival and reproduction, but with the different experiences associated
with these (e.g. finding food, avoiding predation, avoiding disease and injury,
finding social companions). It therefore does not follow that an individual
who does not survive or reproduce will not have many experiences of pleasure
– for instance, a young animal may have many instances of satiety, comfort,
social bonding etc. Individuals at very early life-stages taken by predators
are likely to die quickly, without prolonged suffering. For animals with very
short lives, this may not hold, but then neither will they have lives with very
many experiences so even if they are all suffering, they will not amount to
much in the overall total.
The second is that it is highly likely that these animals have reduced
sentience. That is, that their conscious experience is likely to be dim, and the
high of their highs and low of their lows correspondingly reduced. It is unclear
exactly at which stage of development sentience emerges, and this is likely
to be different for different species – ranging from pre-hatching to several
months after birth (Mellor 2019). It will be a function of establishment of
connections between relevant brain regions, and is likely to correlate with a
stage at which the young first leave their protected spaces and start moving
about autonomously in the external environment and feeding independently,
a time where they will require behavioural flexibility (European Food Safety
Authority 2005; Mellor 2019). However, this does not mean that at this time
sentience is fully developed with the full capacity of an adult member of their
species, particularly regarding the operation of positive and negative valence
systems. There are two issues here – whether the young possess sufficient
neurological complexity to support full sentience, and whether there would
be an adaptive benefit to them to do so.
R-selected species are typically very small and not well-developed, having
only rudimentary sensory organs and neural systems. It is precisely because
of this lifestyle of R-selected species, that many deny that insects feel pain
(Godfrey-Smith 2020). Though there are currently no measures that allow
us to determine the relative sentience of an organism, some proxies have been
suggested, such as number of neurons, or complexity of neural connections.
Particularly, the number of neurons within the regions suggested to be as-
sociated with conscious experience – the pallium in vertebrates, mushroom
bodies in arthropods (which are possible homologues arising from a common



























could be representative of degree and level of sentient experience. For cog-
nitive ability, the number of neurons has been found to be more relevant
than other measures such as brain size or brain to body ratio (Herculano-
Houzel 2009), and the same could be hypothesised for sentience. There is
obviously a lot more work needed here to understand the processes that
produce sentience and determine the relevant proxies, but on any of these
metrics currently proposed, most juvenile/larval animal forms will end up
being less sentient than the adults. This would mean that their suffering will
be correspondingly lower than that of another animal undergoing the same
experiences. Here is another important research area, as greater understand-
ing of the neurophysiology of sentience will help to determine the sentience
capacity and range of affects young may undergo.
We can also consider whether there is an adaptive advantage for these
young to develop full sentience. A complex brain is costly, and is only worth-
while if it provides sufficient benefit. If it is the case that large numbers of
offspring will die early, and in cases where this will be through no fault of
their own (i.e. there is mostly an amount of randomness as to which animals
will perish and which will survive, rather than being a result of the deci-
sions made and actions taken by the animals themselves) then there is no
advantage for animals to develop the capacity to suffer at this stage. If we
take seriously the idea that negative experiences serve to motivate learning
and changes in behaviour to enhance survival, they would not be adaptive
in this context. We already discussed the likely functional role of affect in
motivating behaviour. In cases where an animal is in essence subject to ran-
dom selection in terms of being taken by a predator or finding a food source
before another, there is no selective benefit in having a valence system in
place. Thus, we could expect these animals to not experience strong feelings
and scale their suffering accordingly.
This is highly likely to differ between species. For example, Soryl et al.
(2021) argue that most of these young are precocial and independent, and
thus are likely to require the adaptive benefit of affect-driven motivation.
Many negative affects are ‘survival critical’ affects, such as breathlessness,
thirst, hunger, pain and sickness (Mellor 2019) and thus we would expect
these to emerge quite early for individuals requiring them to motivate the
relevant corrective behaviours in complex environments. Individuals surviv-
ing mostly on reflex behaviours are less likely to require them. We need
then to establish facts about the life histories and behavioural strategies, to



























We have given reasons to think that both the intensity and duration
of suffering is low for r-selected species, and this may therefore mean that
their suffering will not dominate calculations of wild animal welfare. But
even if we grant that these animals do suffer a lot, this does not necessarily
support the conclusion that suffering dominates. The argument given is that
pure numbers cause the suffering to swamp the pleasure, even if we took
the assumption that those who survive do go on to have good lives (which,
as addressed in the previous sections, is not often granted). However, the
problem with this argument is that it seems to conflate number of lives with
amount of suffering. It is not the case that ‘the majority of wild animals
experience net suffering’ is equivalent to ‘suffering prevails in the wild’. Even
if one were to grant that there were this overwhelmingly large number of
individuals with negative lives, it does not have to entail that there is overall
more suffering than pleasure, and this is because the length of lives differ so
significantly.
Take the example used by Oscar Horta (2010), an Atlantic cod. These
cod can produce up to two million eggs, but if the population remains stable
then on average only two will survive to adulthood. He further stipulates a
10% chance of the eggs surviving to hatch, a 10% sentience of the offspring
(he states it as a 10% chance of sentience, but we may also see it as having
10% of the sentience of the adult) and a life that nets 10 seconds of suffering
before death (with perhaps the rest of life being neutral). This will still create
200,000 seconds of suffering, which is the equivalent of around 2.3 days. Thus
we would need to offset 2 days of intense suffering to avoid a net-negative
outcome. The two surviving individuals will have on average a lifespan of 16
years, or 5840 days. If these individuals live a life that is only just barely
positive (say overall 0.1 out of 100), then even if we take the suffering to be
extreme (100/100) then we still end up with the pleasure outweighing the
suffering by over 8x, simply by virtue of length of life. Of course there may
be cases where these numbers can be set such that the suffering will outweigh
the pleasure, but it is at least not immediately obvious and many cases are
instead likely to turn out the way we describe.
Many r-selected species will thus have sufficient positive welfare in their
surviving members to outweigh the suffering of those that die. Additionally,
the K-selected species will not be subject to this effect and so most individuals
will not have lives dominated by suffering (dependent on how we take the
considerations from the previous section). We need to make more direct



























different individuals have, and whether the much longer lives of the surviving
individuals (and the K-selected species) will outweigh the shorter lives of the
unsuccessful r-selected individuals. In this section we have provided reasons
to think that they often will, and thus that pleasure rather than suffering
will dominate in nature.
5 Economic Models
Finally, we have economic models of wild animal welfare that purport to
demonstrate that suffering must dominate in nature. The original and per-
haps most cited paper on this topic came from the Malaysian-Australian
economist Yew-Kwang Ng. In a paper in 1995, Ng argued that we are in
need of a welfare biology, which he defined as the “study of living things and
their environment with respect to their welfare (defined as net happiness,
or enjoyment minus suffering)” (p. 255). As opposed to traditional welfare
science, this was a science focussed more on wild animals, and the effects of
evolutionary and ecological factors on welfare experience; a proposal recently
expanded by Soryl et al. (2021). Like us, Ng advocated a Benthamite subjec-
tive experience view of pleasure and pain, and he maintained that we could
make progress on this difficult problem by combining the insights from eco-
nomics, evolution, and animal welfare science. We agree with the theoretical
underpinnings of such a research program - as stated by Marian Dawkins:
“animal welfare studies generally lacked the evolutionary framework that
characterizes so much else in biology” (Dawkins 1998 p. 305).
Unfortunately, his article contained no serious engagement with animal
welfare science, making it thus unsurprising that there has been very little
development by biologists with the proposed field of ‘welfare biology’, despite
lots of attention by philosophers, animal advocates, and ethicists who saw
it as an alternative to the perceived ‘behaviourist’ and ‘objective’ approach
in animal welfare science. He proposes an “economics of evolution” that he
takes to mean that animals that do not survive through to mating will most
likely have negative welfare. In large part this is due to the excess production
of offspring in so many species, as described in the previous section. He takes
these individuals to have net-negative lives, not due to any specific evidence
but simply because “it is difficult to imagine a positive welfare for such a life”
(Ng 1995 p. 271). As we have already discussed, even if this is true for the



























outweigh overall the positive experiences of their surviving relatives. Yet,
many animal ethicists cited it as scientific ‘proof’ that animals in the wild will
suffer and that we would require radical interventions. After all, Ng himself
claimed that “if we can reduce the number of such miserable individuals,
other things being equal; we can increase the level of over-all welfare” (p.
271). But as our previous sections demonstrated, such intuitions may well
not be well-motivated.
Importantly, Ng’s model relies on the ‘Buddhist premise’, that proposes
that under a set of assumptions about the costs of enjoyment and suffer-
ing, there will be an excess of suffering over enjoyment. This he takes to
imply that the pleasures associated with successful action will be less than
the suffering associated with unsuccessful action. This premise was revised
in a later paper (Groff and Ng 2019), showing the original model to con-
tain mathematical errors undermining his Buddhist premise. The authors
admitted that the balance between positive and negative experiences may
instead go either way, depending on the living conditions of the animal. The
original “model that, when fixed, negates the original conclusion. Instead,
the model offers only ambiguity as to whether suffering or enjoyment pre-
dominates in nature” (Groff and Ng 2019, p. 39). In particular, we need
to better understand the production function of pleasure and suffering. The
original premise contained an assumption of a concave function, or diminish-
ing marginal return - that every additional unit of pleasure (or suffering) will
become increasingly costly as welfare increases (or decreases). Though this
effect may be plausible, according with observations of habituation and di-
minishing marginal utility (Groff and Ng 2019), the revised premise requires
the square of this function be concave, which is much harder to establish.
As they point out, there is the possibility that as the number of doomed
offspring increases, the suffering of each decreases, as the costs of producing
suffering would be unlikely to benefit the organisms in these circumstances;
a point we discussed in the previous section. Without further understanding
of the costs and benefits of affective experiences within the contexts of each
different organism, it is not possible to theoretically hypothesise which is
likely to dominate. This is hardly a surprising claim. If affects evolved to
deal with particular lifestyles in ecological niches, this diversity is just what
would be expected. But the harm had been done and the original model
cited hundreds of time in support of the more radical view of predominant
suffering. Their revision calls for more empirical research to fill out this gap



























endorse here. Economic models simply cannot prove a priori that animal
suffering must outweigh pleasure in the wild. Like claims about bad deaths,
bad lives, or reproductive strategies, we cannot determine in advance what
the relative levels of suffering and enjoyment will be, without further empir-
ical detail. And as we have shown, in many cases we may actually expect a
net-positive.
6 The Intervention Question
One might nevertheless wonder why any of the above points matter at all.
If we all agree that there is a lot of suffering in the wild, is it really all that
important which way the overall balance sits? To some degree, this is true.
There is widespread animal suffering, and if we can establish which processes
are causing the most harm, and how to safely offset them, then we should be
focussing on this. However, there are also some upshots from the claim of wild
animal lives being, on average, net-negative. In particular, it will change how
we calculate the costs and benefits of actions that result in the loss of many
wild animals lives, i.e. when we engage in population ethics for non-human
animals. For example, if nature is dominated by suffering, we may think that
we should take drastic actions such as reduce the numbers of wild animals
(Belshaw 2016) and even reconsider usually morally criticized actions such
as land clearing to be instead a welfare-enhancing action (Tomasik 2017). If
suffering is what we want to eliminate in a world where suffering outweighs
different kinds of pleasures, our policy may be to prevent the birth of wild
animals, rather than improve their lives.
Indeed, we might even think that conservation efforts are detrimental
to animal welfare, insofar as they increase the number of suffering animals.
The idea that the net-negative welfare of wild animals could entail that their
removal would be an improvement has been called the ‘logic of the logger’
(John and Sebo forthcoming). As well as changing the expected value of
actions like these, it will also influence how strong a priority we place on
wild animal welfare in comparison to other areas of animal welfare concern
– such as whether this is a more urgent matter than factory farming. This
is not to say that an acceptance of net-negative wild animal welfare must
necessarily lead to these conclusions – we may think, for example, that de-
struction of habitat would be undesirable because of environmental values or



























vene (Johannsen 2020a). It is not unreasonable to think that such policies
would make our actual treatment of animals worse, for instance, by having
negative effects on human attitudes toward animals (John and Sebo forth-
coming) or if we disrupt habitats such that the species balances change,
favouring r-selected over K-selected species (Johannsen 2020a). As noted by
Vǐsak (2017), recognition of suffering can be addressed either by reducing
the sources of suffering or the bearers of suffering. Where we think that an-
imals have lives of net suffering, we may be drawn toward the latter option,
particularly if we think it would be difficult to address the former. We might
then think the best options are to kill suffering animals (as we would in the
cases of humane euthanasia), and/or to prevent them coming into existence
in the first place. We have shown that there are reasons to doubt that wild
animal lives are predominately suffering, and thus the latter would not be an
ideal strategy. However, even if they were, it is still better where possible to
prevent suffering than to remove its bearers – if we succeed in the former we
would have created more value, rather than simply removing disvalue.
In cases other than these, the question of ‘net’ suffering may be somewhat
of a red herring. Regardless of what we think about the net balance of
welfare for any animal species, it will undoubtedly be true that there are
many sources of suffering and their welfare could potentially be increased.
We need to understand welfare, how affect operates in natural settings, and
the range of experiences different individuals undergo in their lifetimes. If
we identify those processes creating the highest amount of suffering, we can
determine where we may be able to intervene to improve wild animal lives.
The wild animal ethicists are also right to point out that we need to bring wild
animals into our deliberations, even if we end up deciding not to intervene.
Whether or not it dominates, there is a large amount of suffering in nature,
and this is not something we should just ignore.
This leaves the issue of feasibility, perhaps the greatest challenge to wild
animal welfare. Even if we identify sources of suffering, and decide that this
should be of moral concern to us, we may simply lack the ability to intervene
in a controlled or predictable way due to complex interactions and unintended
effects. We may be unable to even predict whether our actions will lead to
a net increase or decrease in wild animal welfare (Delon and Purves 2018).
Indeed, our history of ecological interventions has been for the most part
a worrying one. Ecological systems are highly complex and interconnected,
and small changes in one area can lead to large unintended effects elsewhere.



























reason to dismiss ethical concern. Instead, it can be seen as another rea-
son to further ecological research, alongside conservation biology. The more
we understand about our ecosystems, the better our chances of making wel-
fare improvements. In the end, again, it comes back to a need for better
understanding of wild animals. We could adopt something like ‘fallibility-
constrained interventionism’ (Johannsen 2017) or the ‘interventionist thesis’
(Torres 2015); advocating that we should aim to intervene but only where
we have sufficient understanding of the relevant ecosystems and will not cre-
ate more suffering. Only if we think the problem is entirely intractable –
that there is no way we could obtain enough information to reliably predict
the outcomes of our interventions (or at least with a permissible degree of
uncertainty) – would we think we should never intervene (Delon and Purves
2018). We may be particularly unable to predict the range of indirect effects.
This will be more likely for large scale than for small scale interventions, but
we think this level of pessimism is unwarranted.
There are a range of potential proposed interventions for wild animal
welfare. Some we do already, such as vaccinations against disease outbreaks,
rescuing animals from natural disasters, rearing orphans and supplementing
food during times of shortage (Faria and Paez 2015; Horta 2017). Other pro-
posals may appear more extreme, such as gene editing to reduce the breeding
rate of r-selected species (Johannsen 2017), altering or removing predators
to prevent predation (Bramble 2020; McMahan 2015; Pearce 2015b), elim-
inating parasite species (Johannsen 2020b), genetically modifying animals
to adapt to the consequences of climate change (Palmer 2016), high-tech
‘stewardship’ of entire species (Pearce 2015b), through to a wholescale mod-
ification or redesign of natural systems – what has been termed ‘paradise
engineering’ (Kianpour and Paez 2021) or utilising genetic engineering and
nanotechnology as pathways to alter the neurological processes of all sentient
life with the aim of abolishing all suffering, and enhancing positive experi-
ences (Pearce 2015a). The feasibility and desirability will depend on the
specific context, and understanding of the processes involved - restoration of
habitat or reducing pesticide use probably far more feasible than preventing
predation. Measures such as promoting concern for wild animals and chang-
ing the default assumptions regarding our lack of duties toward them, are
some other methods that can encourage change without necessarily causing




























In this paper, we have shown that the assumptions underlying the claim that
suffering dominates in nature are not always justified, and thus that it at
least as plausible that pleasure dominates. However, as we have emphasised,
this is a matter that requires empirical data to determine the extent of wild
animal suffering. Like Soryl et al. we consider it an “open question whether
the life of a wild animal is worth living” (2021, p. 11); though we are more
optimistic about the answer than they appear to be. There is no doubt that
wild animals suffer a lot. However, what we really want to know is how much,
and what are the primary influences.
There are biological reasons weighing both for and against a model of pre-
dominant suffering in nature, and without further data, we end up merely
trading intuitions. While no-one denies that there are many sources of suffer-
ing for wild animals, there are also many sources of pleasure, and we cannot
from the outside try to weigh these against one another. There are many
reasons why our intuitions may be faulty – we may fail to empathise with the
exact experiences of wild animals or we may only think about small sub-sets
of existing animals (with a bias toward the more visible larger vertebrate
animals) (Horta 2010; Tomasik 2015).
Which types of experience an animal has, their intensities, their durations,
will all be important sources of information to consider, and ones for which
we currently lack most of the important data. Most importantly, we need to
know how the animal itself weights the different experiences – which negative
experiences are worst, and to what degree different positive experiences may
balance them out. There are a number of methods that we may use to assess
the welfare of wild animals (e.g. Harvey et al. 2020), and in a future paper
we will take a closer look at some specific methods that may be suitable
for these ends. Which methods will work best will depend on the context
of measurement, and the types of answers we are looking for. However,
what is important is to establish how the different experiences of an animal’s
life interact and trade off to form a total welfare experience, and whether
this will be overall positive or negative. Importantly, more data is urgently
needed to settle the matter and allow us to move forwards with planning
effective strategies for assistance where required. We should not assume too
much before we know more. It is thus important that animal welfare science
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